Archive for the ‘Australian Patents’ Category

Tuesday, June 29th, 2010

US Supreme Court Decision Bilski v Kappos has now issued

The U.S. Supreme Court today handed down its much awaited Bilski v Kappos decision. The decision is available here [PDF].

Bilski’s patent application was directed to the management of fixed bill energy contracts, in which consumers pay monthly prices for their future energy consumption in advance of winter based on their past energy use. The patent specification, and the claims themselves, omitted any reference to a computer or other technological implementation of invention.

The U.S. Federal Circuit had previously decided that the “machine-or-transformation” test was the sole test for patentability of processes in the US. The “machine-or-transformation” test requires that there be the transformation of a physical article, or a least data representative of a physical article, or that the invention be performed by a particular machine (and not a general purpose computer) in order for patentable subject matter to exist. The software and IT industry feared that many U.S. software patents would fail this test, and that entire U.S. software patent portfolios could be invalid.

The U.S. Supreme Court decision overturns the Federal Circuit’s opinion. Whilst the “machine-or-transformation” test may be useful as an investigative tool, the Court has decided that the “process” category of patentable subject-matter should not be tied to this test only.

The claims of the Bilski patent itself were rejected as covering an unpatentable abstract idea, just like the algorithms at issue in the famous trilogy of U.S. Supreme Court decisions relating to the patentability of software inventions Gottschalk v Benson, Parker v Flook and Diamond v Diehr.

The “machine-or-transformation” test is certainly not dead. In the immediate aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court decision, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has issued a Memorandum instructing U.S. Patent Examiners to continue to examine U.S. patent applications for compliance with the machine-or-transformation test as a tool for determining whether a process is patentable. If the machine-or-transformation test is not met, a patent applicant will need to argue why the invention is not drawn to an abstract idea. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office is reviewing the Bilski v Kappos decision and will develop further guidelines for U.S. Examiners.

The U.S. Supreme Court decision means that business methods which are not implemented using technology are unlikely to be patentable, but that not all “processes” (and computer programs) need necessarily satisfy the “machine-or-transformation” test.

(The position of the U.S. Courts as to the patentability of business methods and software is now very similar to that of the Australian Courts, as set out in Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2006] FCAFC 120. See our commentary on this case here)

Tuesday, March 30th, 2010

Supercharged ownership dispute reversed

In Richwood Creek Pty Ltd v Williams [2010] FCA 196 the Federal Court has reversed a decision of the Patent Office to uphold a patent opposition. The opposition was decided on the ground that the patent applicant alone was not entitled to the grant of a patent. Our commentary on the Patent Office decision is here.

Spender J disagreed that one of the inventors’ rights in the invention vested in his employer. In reaching the decision that the inventor’s (Mr Williams’) invention was not the property of his employer, Spender J was influenced by the inconsistent and insufficient evidence before the Office, for example, there was no written employment contract between Mr Williams and the (alleged) employer. Further, it was significant that the employer did not assert its rights to the invention during the opposition, and Mr Williams did not contest the appeal of the Office’s decision.

Spender J stated that
“Employers’ rights in the inventions of employees are not governed by statute but by common law and equitable principles which clearly show that in the absence of any express contractual obligation there is no rule that an invention made by an employee is inevitably the property of the employer. It is instead necessary to determine whether the employment relationship suggests that the invention concerned was made in the course of employment or, in other words, whether it is something it was the employee’s job to invent.”

In this case, there was not enough information for the Court to find that the employment relationship suggested the invention was made in the course of Mr Williams’ employment.

The decision re-iterates the importance of ensuring employment contracts specify who is to own an employee’s inventions. This issue has of course also been highlighted recently by the well publicised Federal Court decisions in University of Western Australia v Gray (see our posts here and here).

Monday, March 29th, 2010

And then we were one…NZ & Australian courts move closer

In November 2009 the Australia Government introduced legislation implementing the Agreement between Australia and New Zealand on Trans-Tasman Court Proceedings and Regulatory Enforcement. The Trans-Tasman Proceedings Bill 2010 was passed by both Houses of the Australian Parliament and is now awaiting Royal Assent.

The New Zealand Government introduced parallel legislation on 24 November 2009. The Bill received its first reading on 23 March 2010 and has been referred to a Parliamentary Select Committee. Submissions in the Bill are due by 7 May 2010 and the Select Committee’s Report is due on 29 July 2010.

While the two countries treat each other in the same way when it comes to cross-border court proceedings, this legislation will enable closer integration of the two civil justice systems.
Some important measures in the Bill include:

  1. Simplifying the service requirement for civil court proceedings.  For instance the new legislation will enable a statement of claim filed in a court to be served on someone in New Zealand as of right and visa versa. A plaintiff will no longer be required to prove a connection between the proceedings and New Zealand, or to seek leave of the court.
  2. The New Zealand Bill and its Australian equivalent will adopt a common give-way rule for deciding which country’s court should hear a dispute. The current problem of courts in New Zealand and Australian applying different tests to decide this issue leading to unnecessary expense and uncertainty will hopefully be ameliorated.
  3. The Bill will expand the range of Australian court judgments that can be enforced in New Zealand, and simplify the process for enforcing them. Currently, only final money judgments from one country may be enforced in the other. This Bill extends this to include final non-money judgments, such as an injunction. The only ground for not enforcing an Australian judgment will be public policy.  However, it will continue the case that any challenge to the merits of a judgment will meed to be raised with the original court.
  4. The Bill also introduces new measures to improve regulatory enforcement. New Zealand and Australia both have a strong mutual interest in the integrity of trans-Tasman markets and the effective enforcement of each other’s regulatory regimes. The bill will allow all Australian civil pecuniary penalties to be enforced in New Zealand, unless they are specifically excluded from the regime. The parallel legislation in Australia contains mirror provisions.
  5. The Bill will also allow criminal fines to be enforced in the same way as a civil judgment debt is but only in respect of those regulatory regimes that affect the integrity, effectiveness, and efficiency of trans-Tasman markets.
  6. Finally the Bill will simplify the conduct of court proceedings in various ways including through the use of technology.

Friday, March 19th, 2010

Beware the idiosyncratic expert

The decision of Bennett J in Inverness Medical Switzerland GmbH v MDS Diagnostics Pty Limited [2010] FCA 108 highlights the importance of expert witnesses being truly representative of the hypothetical person skilled in the art.

Inverness relied on the evidence of Boscato, “a person who works at a bench in a laboratory rather than being a theoretical researcher. She has designed and made immunoassays, uses them routinely and has a “practical interest” in the subject matter of the invention.” By comparison, MDS relied on the evidence of Sinosich, a person who “has worked in the field of immunoassay development, including immunoassays for a range of fertility, pregnancy and non-pregnancy associated analytes. He has generated both polyclonal and monoclonal antibodies; all of his research activity has been antibody-based.”

A significant issue in the case was the construction to be given to the expression “specific binding reagent” as used in the claims of the patent. Sinosich considered that the adjective “specific” used in relation to a reagent was a term of art meaning that the reagent would preferentially bind to an analyte in the immunoassay with no binding to any other molecule in the sample. Boscato agreed that, in the context of immunoassays, “specificity” meant the ability to measure the analyte without interference from other substances which would cause a false positive response, or interference from other substances causing an inaccurate result but that there was a distinction between the use of “specificity” and “specific”. Boscato considered that the use of “specific” in the phrase “a specific binding reagent for an analyte” meant that the reagent has to be able to bind the analyte of interest in a specific binding reaction, but not necessarily exclusively.

In relation to the difference in interpretation between the two expert witnesses, Bennet J commented that:

I formed the clear impression that, while Dr Sinosich gave his opinion honestly and impartially, his approach was, as he conceded in evidence, influenced by his own specific area of expertise and his own rigorous approach to the relevant terminology. It was apparent during cross-examination when Dr Sinosich was taken to different parts of the specification that the patentee did not adopt the same limited use of terminology.

Another important consideration in determining the correct construction, as noted by her Honour, was that Sinosich’s construction did not accord with much of the literature as at the priority date, or with the specification, which has broader application. By comparison, Boscato pointed to literature which formed part of the prior art, including papers considered to be very important in the field at the priority date, which showed use of the expression “specific binding reagent” consistent with her construction. Bennet J concluded that:

Dr Sinosich’s use of the terminology may well reflect his own experience and practice but the evidence suggests that it is not and was not the common use of others in the art to which the specification relates.

This decision highlights the importance of carefully selecting expert witnesses but also the importance of contemporaneous documentary evidence in supporting the views expressed by those witnesses

Friday, March 12th, 2010

High Court refuses special leave in Sanofi-Aventis case

The High Court today refused the application by Sanofi-Aventis for special leave to appeal the decision of the Full Federal Court in Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis [2009] FCAFC 134, meaning the decision of that court stands.

Our review of that case is here.

Tuesday, February 23rd, 2010

Hard lesson to be learned

“On a practical level the lesson of this case may be there is a need for express arrangements” – Gummow J special leave hearing

The impact of the recent decision of the High Court of Australia to refuse the University of Western Australia’s application for special leave to appeal from the Full Federal Court’s decision (reported here) cannot be underestimated.  While it represented the end of a very lengthy battle that commenced in December 2004, this decision will have huge impact on universities and their commercial dealings with private sector groups.

Universities will now need to have in place effective procedures and clear contractual terms dealing with the ownership of inventions created by academic staff.  It is clear that the rule in Sterling v Patchett [1955] AC 534 that an employer is entitled to any product of the work which the employee is paid to do unless it is excluded by express agreement and whether that product is patentable or not, does not extend to academic staff employed by universities.

There is an immediate need for universities to review all existing projects to address the question of the ownership of IP and to resolve ownership, before entering into any commercial arrangement.  Likewise companies that rely on research conducted by universities will need to ensure the ownership of any IP generated in these projects has been adequately addressed.

Friday, February 12th, 2010

End of the road for UWA

The High Court today refused the application by the University of Western Australia for special leave to appeal the decision of the Full Federal Court in University of Western Australia v Gray [2009] FCAFC 116. Our analysis of that case is here.

There is no further avenue of appeal. We expect to issue a further update when we have examined the transcript, which is not yet available.

The University issued this statement today.

Monday, February 8th, 2010

Commercialisation Australia grants cover IP costs

The Australian Government’s Commercialisation Australia initiative provides grants of up to $50,000 to access specialist business advice and services including intellectual property management.

IP Australia reported today that eligible expenditure include fees for the cost of filing a patent application, patent search and examination fees, and annual patent maintenance fees.

An overview of the scheme is here.

Wednesday, December 23rd, 2009

Dodgy IP register caught by court

A Florida-based company that issued misleading invoices to patent and trade mark applicants was recently found to have violated the state’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.

This serves as a timely reminder that there are several organisations that issue official-looking documents to owners of recently granted (or due for renewal) patents and trade marks. The documents usually look like invoices and solicit payment for a service of no value at all.

Further information on this problem, including a list of organisations engaged in the practice, is here.

Thursday, December 17th, 2009

The end of the “appeal” road for Dura-Post

Dura-Post (Aust) Pty Ltd’s application for special leave to appeal from the Full Federal Court’s decision was refused by the High Court of Australia on 11 December 2009.  As reported earlier here, the Full Court of the Federal Court upheld the decision of Justice Gyles including his findings on innovative step.

In reaching its decision, the Full Court confirmed that when considering whether the invention claimed is in respect of an ‘innovative step’, the Court must compare the invention as claimed with each prior art disclosure and identify whether any variations between the invention and the prior disclosure make a substantial contribution to the working of the invention.

The Full Court also accepted the trial judge’s view that “substantial” contribution in the context of section 7(4) means “real” or “of substance” as opposed to distinctions without any real difference.

The High Court’s decision to refuse special leave not only confirms the approach taken by Justice Gyles and the Full Court in assessing whether an invention involves an innovative step, but it also reinforces the value of innovation patent system for those inventions that would not otherwise be protectable by reason that they do not involve an inventive step.