Thursday, July 31st, 2008
AusPat upgraded
IP Australia has implemented additional functionality to its patent search system, AusPat.
Details of the changes are available on AusPat’s home page.
IP Australia has implemented additional functionality to its patent search system, AusPat.
Details of the changes are available on AusPat’s home page.
The decision of Dowsett J in Occupational and Medical Innovations Ltd ACN 091 192 871 v Retractable Technologies Inc [2008] FCA 1102, has highlight an apparently significant restriction in the operation of section 125 of the Patents Act.
Section 125 allows a person to apply to a Court for a declaration that the exploitation of an invention would not infringe a claim of a particular complete specification. Section 126 imposes certain preconditions on the making of such an application, including that the Court:
must not make a non-infringement declaration unless a patent has been granted in respect of the relevant invention
Dowsett J held that:
The applicant will be entitled to apply under s 125 if he or she wishes lawfully to exploit the relevant invention. However subs 126(1) provides that no declaration may be made unless and until a patent has been granted for the invention. In my view the patent referred to in subs 126(1) and para 126(1)(c) is that which relates to the invention which the applicant proposes to exploit.
Accordingly, only a patentee wishing to exploit their invention, which falls within the scope of the claims of their patent, may apply to the Court for such a declaration.
IP Australia and the United States’ Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) have announced an agreement that will see IP Australia act as an international search and examination authority for international applications filed with the USPTO under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT).
US PCT applicants can now choose IP Australia to undertake their initial search and examination.
IP Australia is already an international search and examination authority for 17 countries including the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Singapore, India and Malaysia.
In the decision of the Full Federal Court of Australia in IGT (Australia) Pty Ltd v Aristocrat Technologies Australia Ltd [2008] FCAFC 131 Justice Gyles has thrown doubt on the correctness of the approach adopted by the Commissioner and the Federal Court on appeal under section 60(4) with respect to the Opponent’s onus in pre-grant oppositions. For a number of years the authorities have drawn a distinction between opposition and revocation proceedings. The judge at first instance summarized the distinction as follows (Aristocrat Technologies (2007) 239 ALR 181, (2007) 71 IPR 259 at [11]):
“whether it can be concluded clearly or as a matter of practical certainty that the opposition is well made and that the patent, if granted, would be bad, … the issue for resolution by the court is not whether the matters grounding the opposition (here want of novelty and obviousness) have been made out in the manner required in revocation proceedings.” (Original emphasis.)
It will now be very interesting to see whether Justice Gyles’ views get a chance to be tested at a later time.
The long awaited New Zealand Patents Bill having key provisions substantially modeled on the Australian Patents Act has been introduced into the New Zealand Parliament. It is expected that the first reading of the Bill and referral to the Select Committee should occur within the next few months. Once the Bill has been referred to the Committee, submissions will be invited. At this stage it is not possible to predict when the Bill will be enacted but it is unlikely to come into force before late 2009.
Gyles J in Gillette Company v Schiavini [2008] FCA 1053 has confirmed the longstanding view that mere importation is use as a trade mark such as to constitute an infringement of a trade mark proprietor’s rights.
a conventional one in the original jurisdiction of the court, in which the questions which were before the delegate are again in controversy, and must be decided on the evidence that is tendered and admitted here. The admission of that evidence is, in my view, regulated by the Evidence Act in the normal way.
Accordingly, his Honour upheld Sherman’s objections, finding inter alia that the declarations filed during the opposition were inadmissible as hearsay.
In Boyapati v Rockefeller Management Corporation [2008] FCA 995, Kenny J considered, amongst other causes of action, a claim for infringement of copyright in a series of tests designed to prepare candidates for the Undergraduate Medicine & Health Sciences Admission Test (“UMAT”).
Whilst the evidence established that she [the second applicant] derived the balance of the questions and answers from third party sources, she used these sources in different ways, selecting, adapting and modifying them to varying degrees to suit her purpose of compiling sets of practice exams that simulated the UMAT. Even where she made minimal modification to a pre-existing question, she exercised skill and judgment in selecting the question and including it in either section 1 or 2, depending on whether it concerned logical reasoning or interaction skills. There was also a degree of skill and judgment involved in organising the sequence and, to a lesser extent, the number of questions in sections 1 and 2 so as to simulate the UMAT. The practice exams that she created were therefore a product of her skill, judgment and labour, combined with that of Ray and Edward Boyapati to the extent that they contributed to the process. The skill, judgment and labour involved were sufficiently substantial to attract copyright.
In addition to finding that the respondent had infringed copyright, her Honour also held that the applicants should succeed in their claim for conversion under s 116 of the Copyright Act. The Court made orders that the parties file further submissions in relation to the appropriate relief, both for the conversion and copyright infringement, including whether additional damages should be awarded.
Jemella Australia Pty Ltd v MacKinnon [2008] FCA 1022 relates to a Customs seizure and an application for an extension of time under section 137 of the Trade Marks Act. It appears that the 10 day period for instituting infringement proceedings is rigid and that if any extension is sought it must be applied for and granted within the 10-day period.